This proposal refers to the “75% Governance Giveback” topic of the No Abnormal Intervention proposal, which was part of the Impact Hour Intervention voting session that happened on TokenLog in July 2021.
Background: 48 contributors that were compensated by the Commons Stack, Giveth, Commons Swarm or General Magic for the work done in the TEC received an IH deduction during praise quantifications. Deductions varied wildly. Some contributors were mostly volunteering, and some were paid almost the full time.
Problem: During the Praise Analysis Process, this deduction was claimed unfair by part of the community and was defended by another.
1. Unfair: One of the arguments to change the deduction system was that it makes little sense to penalize members who are so dedicated to the project, this actually hurts the TEC as we will lose their valuable perspective in our governance.
2. Fair: One of the arguments to not change the deduction system is that it is not fair to double reward the people who are receiving compensation financially since many volunteers were offered compensation but chose to work for Impact Hours, knowing they would later become tokens.
We are proposing:
Solution: The No Abnormal Intervention Proposal, which got the most votes front he community in the Praise Debates proposed a “75% Governance Giveback” acknowledging the intertwining of money and governance rights is not ideal and strikes a compromise between both points.
The goal is to replace 75% of the governance rights that were deducted from these 48 contributors without giving them any monetary rewards, effectively giving them back some of the voice that earned but taken away because of their monetary rewards.
The Impact Hour Intervention vote ended with a compromise between Praisemagedon and No Abnormal Intervention due to a polarized scenario. Deductions were lessoned by the inclusion of Praisemageedon, but there were still deductions in Praisemaggedon’s revised distribution.
If we were to reward 75% of the Governance rights to those with deductions, this is what it would look like:
|Handle||75% Gov Rights|
The math behind this Calculation can be seen here:
We respectfully ask that if this proposal passes we let the Commons Swarm debate the merits of both technical solutions and research them further in an open process before deciding which one to pursue.
There are 2 main technical solutions
#1 Quick and Dirty: The quick solution is to make a one character change to the smart contract that would enable us to mint TEC tokens without affecting the bonding curve but place them in a vesting contract that will lock them forever. This solution is being reviewed for security issues by our smart contract reviewers. If it is deemed to be secure, it is a very simple and practical solution as it requires almost no work to implement and it could be implemented in the Commons Upgrade. However, it is not elegant. Changing the bonding curve to ignore these tokens could be confusing especailly since it will look like each of these 48 contributors will have these funds in their address, but they will not be able to transfer them out.
#2 Slow and Steady: A better solution would be to create a different non-transferable token that could be used alongside the TEC token for governance decisions. Unfortunately the tooling to do this does not exist for Conviction Voting which currently can only support voting with 1 token. We would need to fund the creation of an Aragon app that could aggregate multiple tokens for voting on Conviction Voting. This is the better approach and it is very likely that this solution would solve other problems for other communities using Conviction Voting. In fact, it is likely to be pursued eventually no matter what the outcome of this vote is, however this will take many months to design, build, test, review, and deploy and technical challenges may arise that can make it more difficult than we expect. It is unclear when it would be prioritized to be built, who would fund it (likely 1hive and the TEC?) and there is no way that it will be done before the Commons Upgrade, so it would require the TE Commons to vote to upgrade Conviction voting later to include it.
Here is a diagram Sem drew of the Slow and Steady solution, the Hooked Voting Aggregator is the App that needs to be built.
#3 The Unknown Better Solution: Potentially another solution could emerge as an option as well. We are open to various technical solutions to achieve this outcome. If this vote passes the developers that will implement the solution will review the options and choose the best path forward.
Expected duration or delivery date (if applicable):
How long do you think it will take to deliver on your proposal
We will work with the Commons Swarm to have the best possible solution up as soon as possible. Either in conjunction with the Commons Upgrade or after, depending on the solution chosen.
How does this help Token Engineers and benefit the Token Engineering community?
The deductions that were made took well deserved governance rights away from important contributors. Their knowledge of the ins and outs of the TEC are very valuable and their voice being given extra power will help the DAO make better decisions.
- Possible New Aragon devs
Skills and previous experience in related or similar work:
We have been trying to promote the best rewards systems. Its hard to work with coin voting governance while also having regular payments to develop the tools. We want this proposal to be a retroactive governance payment that boosts the decision taking capabilities of core participants in the TEC DAO.
Amount of tokens requested: Aprox 191,876.95 TEC that would be locked to not affect the bonding curve