I agree with Chuy here. My second thought was that we should implement something that would prevent this from happening in the future.
I could also propose another thing, why not give me and all other contributing members to the TEC a payout for their impact hours commensurate with the amounts given to those who were paid? That is to say, a multiplier of those, since those who were paid gained a LOT of praise since it was literally their job to do so.
Iām not saying we shouldnāt be able to change our minds and revise things after the fact, quite the opposite, but this would seem to go against the spirit of this working arrangement to then shift permanent voting power to the core members who were paid.
You are certain to get praise and impact hours from being paid to do your work in the TEC, so those people who WERE paid should be excluded from those remunerated in the first place.
I can see a much lesser amount- like up to 30% given, but 75% is a LOT.
I didnāt want to give my opinion (since my participation in TEC has been reduced considerably), but as this come up yesterday in the Commons Swarm meeting, I guess itās worth it to write my unelaborated thoughts here (sorry for doing it in a rush).
I think DAOs should be at the same time innovative organizations that have a lot of capacity to adapt to the new challenges that the world present to them, and resilient and stable institutions in which people can trust, predict, and stay in the long-term.
Both 1hive and TECommons have small groups that organize around strategic goals for the DAO. These groups are spawn when it is needed, and they should disappear when the need they were covering is not present anymore, so people can work then on more valuable things that can make the DAO thrive much more.
At the same time, the common rules for all the working groups and people who is involved in the DAO should be clear, easy to understand, and more or less inmutable over time. In the case of 1hive it is clear: anything that people want be funded has to be voted through conviction voting, whatever it is and whoever it is that is requesting the funds. The emission of new honey is also well established and it is the only way in which it is being created, not benefiting any individual or group.
TECommons is different than 1hive in many different ways, and I donāt think that one model must fit all the cases. I think TEC has to find the way in which it is going to govern itself. What things are acceptable, and which are not.
I think this debate is going to be very important for the long-term sustainability of TEC, in order for democracy not to be abused. As Churchill once said:
āMany forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.ā¦ā
Democracy can foster the tyranny of the majority. This is why having a limited democracy, in which the power of the people is limited to the parameters of a charter, may look like a good solution for an institution like a DAO. Establishing which are the rights of TEC holders, and use governance for anything except for violating the rights of TEC holders. This is why it is that important the TEC covenant that is being discussed in Soft Gov and is going to be used to dispute decisions in Celeste.
Its very interesting to continue having this discussion. The voting round ended yesterday and the results presented 92.57% of approval, but this late signaling should be taken into account.
I feel that this proposal helps to advance the token engineering field by proposing alternatives to coin voting governance and that the governance giveback to core contributors really compensates to people whose governance was reduced due to the IH distribution.
We have the agency to decide how to proceed in this situation. I think that the debate goes more around the technical solution than the governance giveback itself, so i think that Soft gov would be a good place to bring this topic out, also deep dive on it during commons swarms calls, and continue engaging in this forum thread to follow up the course of action.
I also voted no for this proposal for similar reasons to some that @chuygarcia92 and @0xNuggan mentioned. I had expressed my opinion before and I think itās great to have diverse perspectives in this topic!
The reasons why I like this proposal are:
The research for a solution that separates gov and financial power in the token design can be an important piece of work for the token engineering field.
The follow up from no abnormal intervention to make this proposal with work and attention feels great. It shows maturity and accountability to previous commitments.
the reasons I voted no to this proposal is:
It feels rushed to have something so complex like this be implemented before the commons upgrade.
It could delay the launch.
We could be opening cultural problems that our future selves might be mad at us for
that being said, I would still love to see research being done in this direction - of separating gov and financial power in the token modeling and design, integrating it with the bonding curve and so on.
Since this signaling was for the development of a solution by the Commons Swarm team, I really second @0xNuggan opinion. Binding the additional voting power to the vesting period sounds like a very elegant solution.
In regards of @0xNuggan proposal, I understand it today. Itās not about applying vesting to those tokens (so they can be made transferable afterwards), itās about to burn them after a certain period of time (maybe progressively over time until all of them are burnt).
It is technically feasible by attaching a contract with burn permissions to the Token Manager, so it can burn them progressively over time (during the vesting period or some other period of time decided). This technical solution can be done because the governance tokens are non-transferable and the token holders are few.
I guess that would require a proposal like this one. It should be voted on snapshot before the commons upgrade, and with different options for periods, including āindefinitelyā in the options. Avoid the use of the word vesting, as itās not exactly what itās done. Itās burning progressively the governance power.
Iām personally convinced this option could work, thank you for sharing your thoughts @0xNuggan and I apologize again to the community for not expressing these concerns appropriately and in a more convenient manner.
These people earned governance, like the rest of the volunteer contributors, but they were paid so it was taken away from them because it wasnāt fair for the people who chose to not receive monetary reward and the governance was attached to a monetary value.
If we can remedy this we, as a DAO, will be better for it. They will get the governance rights but it will still be fair for the people who volunteered, as they will get only 75% of what they were supposed to get and no monetary reward.
Currently as designed, 191k tokens is 8% of the total supply, and when we launch the bonding curve, this will be further diluted as the TEC Growsā¦ it will likely be below 5% of the tokens in no time.
This is very much safe enough to tryā¦ the idea that this governance is āStuckā in these peopleās wallets is not a problem to meā¦ in the end, anyone in the world will be able to buy 191k in tokens, very likely for <$500k and then never sell itā¦ so it will also be stuck in their wallet. If they choose to vote or notā¦ its exactly the sameā¦ the big difference is that the people who have the locked tokens cannot extract value from the bonding curve.
The people with locked tokens:
Donāt have to vote
Are all trusted members of the community
Have skin in the game from the work they put in.
As far as fears around the technical solutionā¦ We have to trust the integrity of our development team.
We will not ship something that is not safe.
And personally I am pushing to make sure that we can launch without this in the Commons Upgrade, if an acceptable technical solution is not ready in time. IMO the priority is to launch and then if we need to make another vote later to upgrade (which will be a huge ordeal and annoying, but still very feasible) then we do thatā¦
The quick and dirty solution was not approved by Brett the code reviewer but Solution #3 is likely to be pursued
The details on the implementation has a lot of niche technical concerns that we have to trust the people who live in the code and have an understanding of everything, just as we trust David, Chuy, Ivy and crew to run our twitter, Juanka, Durgadas, and crew to manage Gravity, Santi and Shawn to manage legal, etc etcā¦
This proposal will not be able to be fully implemented before the Upgrade.
The good news is that the Conviction Voting Smart Contracts are going to be upgraded soon so that they will be easier to configure for this and other purposes and that should be done before we launch!
This is 1/2 of the battleā¦ and makes doing it after the Upgrade not so bad. We will have to use Tao Voting to configure CV to include a second, non-transferable token as a voting token after launchā¦ That is not as simple as it sounds and will take testing and forethoughtā¦ We will do what we can to make sure all the precursors are there so that itās not so hard to do!
, itās progressive burn 
