We have broken down a new 1hive Gardens template in a discussion between Griff and Luke. The TEC Hatch DAO, when it likely upgrades to a Commons, will be able to leverage the new tools 1hive is going to put into practice this month. Specifically, the TEC Hatch DAO will use Dandelion Voting, but when it upgrades to a Commons it will use Tao Voting.
This new Tao Voting app adds some new mechanics to voting which include delegating votes, protection against last-minute vote result flipping and a framework for disputing proposals. This was originally designed and audited for the Aragon Network DAO but was never implemented.
There’s a few concepts that should be outlined before diving into specific parameters.
#1 Delegation: This process would allow token holders to vest their voting powers to a delegate who will cast votes on their behalf. A voter however does not give up full control. The delegates are forced to vote early in the voting period and if the token holder sees that their delegate has voted contrary to the token holder’s will they can veto their vested portion of the delegate’s vote and cast their vote themselves. Both a delegate and a token holder can only vote ONCE.
#2 Disputability: Proposals can be disputed by a challenger, the proposer must respond by either negotiating a settlement or escalating the challenge to Celeste or a form of court and must fork out a token fee to assign and pay jurors to mediate the dispute. Check out our thread on Celeste for more info.
#3 Wait for Quiet: If a proposal has a change in outcome near the end of the voting period, more time will be added to the end of the voting period so that the token holders that have yet to cast their vote have an opportunity to express their opinion on the controversial proposal.
There is no “rageQuit” mechanism as this functionality is effectively replaced by the Augmented Bonding Curve.
Those are the overarching concepts that Tao Voting contributes. Let’s dive into the parameters:
Tao Voting Discussions
Delegated Voting Period
Quiet Ending Period
Vote Execution Delay
The Agreement Parameters for Disputability details are still being locked down and will be soon added to this document!
Disputable Voting will be “god-mode” for the TE Commons (after the Commons Upgrade, before that, Dandelion Voting is “god-mode” for the TEC Hatch DAO).
It is the voting app that has permission to change almost every parameter of the economy… and it can even change permissions! If the token holders wanted to they could vote to make @liviade the benevolent dictator of the entire economy give her the power to upgrade the contracts into a completely new framework or to send all the money in the bonding curve to a yield farming pool! 3000 APY MUCH WOW!
This is obviously very unlikely to happen… and I wouldn’t expect any votes to happen very often honestly. But I would expect a few times a year we may want to make changes to parameters like the entry and exit tributes for the bonding curve, or upgrade some of our systems to include new innovations that 1hive and the Commons Stack are working on. Disputable Voting will be how we do that.
@Griff some questions I didn’t get time to ask in the Soft Gov meeting…
-What are the requirements to become a juror - is it just being a HNY whale? Or anyone with HNY can self elect?
-Could we decide as TEC that the jurors must undergo Graviton training?
-Are we planning to hold a vote to implement this in TEC?
-Are we planning to implement this with TEC tokens?
-In Celeste it said that those who vote w/ majority will be rewarded - didn’t quite understand the full aspects of this from the text in the Celeste dapp - can you explain this mechanism and why it is there?
Thank you for all the hard work!! I logged into Celeste to play with it… The UI/UX is great especially!
(I couldn’t become a juror yet because I signed up to 1Hive with a Portis wallet - b/c of a bug at the time - and there is no option for Portis inside Celeste, so trying to reassign my 1Hive wallet as my Metamask - made a Github issue and chatting with Fabrizio about it, but hope to have a walk through soon.)
Very interesting developments and experimenting with new governance mechanisms - kudos pioneers!
Yes Disputable Voting will be able to send the money out of all the contracts to anything and it will be able to mint and burn tokens. It can’t technically change the smart contracts… but because of these other powers… it doesn’t really need to.
Dandelion voting will have the same powers… but only for the TEC Hatch DAO.
This might sound scary… but this is how DAO’s work. The Token Holders can vote to turn the DAO into a duck if they want to (once the tech advances QUACK) This is why it is soooooo critical that we have a collective agreement on what qualifies as a passing proposal.
These powers might be used at the beginning a fair amount as we scale and want to tweak the params and add new features/apps… but after the first year, I would assume we will find a nice steady state and these powers will be rarely called upon