Regarding the two technical solutions, I think the first âQuick and Dirtyâ one should be out of the table. Something like token governance should not be taken lightly, and proposing something like this is a HUGE change in relation of the initial Commons design we had in mind.
I can not commit to include a technical solution for the 75% Governance Giveback within the Commons Upgrade. The development of the upgrade is complex enough, and implementing the âQuick and Dirtyâ solution would make the new Augmented Bonding Curve flawed by design, since under certain circumstances it could incur in an integer overflow error.
This is something I already told in many Commons Swarm meetings, there is not a quick and good solution. If the community still want to give back governance rights, the solution will be slow and probably expensive, as this requires a redesign and re-implementation of many apps.
If this vote passes, it will just signal which path the community want this to go, but no one can work miracles.
First, I love the intention of this proposal as it shows how we can come together to find solutions to the challenges that we have faced within our community. From the Praise Analysis to the IH Intervention Proposals, our ability to adapt and come up with creative solutions is truly unique in the DAO space.
While I can only speak for myself, I want to state that I do not care about receiving the additional Governance Rights associated with Conviction Voting (in particular). In the end, my additional (4k) TEC voting rights is a fraction of an increase to the overall voting impact that I have as an individual.
I would love to see the distribution of voting power by individuals overall and place that under the same lens as we did with our IH distribution. As Sem said, Governance is very important, and while I appreciate the attempt for remuneration for IH deductions, the overall strategy for long-term governance is far more important in my opinion.
I LOVE the mechanism of having a staking contract for Governance tokens. However, I think that the application of this mechanism to giving individuals additional voting power is not as strategic as it could be in terms of developing an effective governance strategy. My feeling, is that this mechanism would be far more effective if we instead created a single pool of Governance tokens that can be managed by a committee of TE experts (appointed by our community and managed via multi-sig address) who can guide, influence and inform all TEC token-holders on what Projects they believe are the most vital for TE funding.
The feasibility of our technical solutions may make this a non-starter, but I do believe thinking about Governance from a strategic standpoint is worthy of a conversation. Iâm incredibly neutral about the outcome of this proposal, but I am VERY interested in developing the mechanism that allows it to happen.
I think that can be dangerous, it will give a group of people a certain privilege and power, especially in a field of study where new branches might be born more often than what we think. Another thing that Iâm personally afraid of taking decisions of this magnitude is if someone wanna do something, gotta coordinate with them creating a bureaucracy where this group of people would be the bureaucrats. It could also lead to a dictatorship where this group of people only need to coordinate with key members to rule the commons at their own. I feel itâs good to hear âTE Expertsâ but if they want to decide anything they must have skin in the game or their influence should be limited to the people that want to hear them and of course have tokens. If we make a decision of concentrate the power it will also be more easy to bribe this people or to them to bribe others (since they might have a high control on our treasury)
We should think about how many keys do we need right now to rule the commons and how to make it decentralize so human feelings do not get in the way of the goal of the common. I wanna clarify that, the initial distribution seems pretty representative on the skin on the game with that iâm not saying that the previus conflict was good it was clearly bad for us if you see pros and cons and the only reason that was able to happen itâs because weird power dynamics outside TEC and human feelings so i really encourage us to keep decentralize and do not create âTE Expertsâ.
The code can be checked for that integer overflow issues, and we can test it. While the bonding curve may lose some of its elegance, if the review comes out with no issues, the curve will gain a lot of functionality.
Separating Governance power from value is something that this space, and the TEC specifically could benefit greatly from.
Giving the Tao voting app (formerly disputable voting) the permission to create a negative Virtual Supply could let it create issues in the Commons⌠but the Tao voting app already can vote to remove money out of the bonding curve and send it to 0x0. Giving the Tao Voting app the option to screw things up doesnât add any more risk, as it already has that option in 100 different ways. Any use of this added functionality would have to be reviewed carefully, but I donât believe the fear of an integer overflow error is justified if the functionality passes a code review.
In the end of course, Ethereum just had a chain split, things can go wrong no matter how well we review things, but we have to measure the risk vs the reward. Here, IMO, if the risk is assessed to be very low we shoudl do it because the reward for future functionality is massive.
There are many use cases for giving out governance rights without connecting it to a monetary instrument. For instance, if a non-profit/foundation would find it to be too complicated to add a token of value to itâs accounting, it could just send money directly to the Common Pool and then we mint the org a token with governance rights and no value!
Of course there are more complicated and better ways to create this solution⌠but they are not very practical relative to a 1 character change that was reviewed and deemed to be safe.
I think I could not be more clear: there is not a quick and good solution. I am not going to deploy a change that potentially can lead to a failure of the bonding curve. I already explained why in the previous post.
The good thing is we donât have to vote as a community on the technical solution, thatâs more of a Commons Swarm decision. The vote here is whether its even worth investigating.
In sept 6 Commons swarm call, @sem presented a technical solution (HOOKED TOKEN MANAGER) that could be implemented before the commons upgrade and can be useful until the implementation of multi token gardens. With that part of the advice process more cleared out, I think this proposal is ready to proceed and look for the communityâs support to return governance to core members of the project, who had TEC tokens reduced for their monetary compensations.
This vote is proposed to be done on the weekend of September 17-20. Using Quadratic voting on snapshot
âDo you support the implementation of a technical solution that makes a 75% governance giveback to paid contributors who were deducted TEC tokens previous to the hatch?â
Allow me to show strong support the binary yes/no framing and leaving the solution to the experts, aka Commons Swarm, to determine! But, I find myself asking how we determine whether a vote should take place on Snapshot versus the HatchDAO. What criteria should be used?
It seems there might be at least these two criteria which would necessitate a HatchDAO vote:
Request for funding from the DAO
Proposal to change the DAO code itself or have significant impact on technical architecture
If we agree this to be true, then this proposal - in which the solution implemented would create a new form of governance-only token - would qualify as âsignificant change to HatchDAOâ and would need to go to Hatch DAO vote.
The Snapshot vote is preferable for all the reasons explained in @liviadeâs post on Decision Making but we may be setting a precedent by doing so.
It is not a change in the Hatch DAO, but in the Commons DAO, so this decision could be made in the Commons Upgrade vote itself. However, Commons Swarm will also need economic support for building the Hooked Voting Aggregator. We could request 5,000 wxDAI from the Hatch DAO to build this solution, and once the solution is built ratify the decision with the Commons Upgrade vote.
You can delegate your tao voting power to somebody else, or even a DAO controlled by a group of stakeholders (something like a political party?). Delegation is not possible in Conviction Voting, since the dynamic of this kind of voting performs badly without direct democracy.
Thanks for this clarification, @sem. We talked the next steps in the Stewardsâ call yesterday and will move forward with a Snapshot yes/no vote (expected to happen from Sept 24 - 27th). A âyesâ vote would mean that it will be included in the Commons upgrade vote. This way it will still be voted via Hatch DAO but bundled together with the rest of the parameters for the Commons upgrade.
As Tam states, after receiving feedback from the advice process, we have decided that this vote is going to be held between the 24th - 27th September. I will post here the snapshot vote for everyone to participate. Letâs coordinate with @chuygarcia92 to promote engagement.
*The execution of this proposal will be bundled within the commons upgrade.
"Do you support the funding and implementation of a technical solution that will allow to make a 75% governance giveback to paid contributors who were deducted TEC tokens previous to the hatch?
After the latest advices on snapshot, this is the text that will be displayed for the vote:
This proposal is meant to signal the community support for the funding and implementation of a technical solution that will allow to make a 75% governance giveback to paid contributors who were deducted Impact Hours previous to the Hatch
The funding of this proposal will be used to support the Commons Swarm team to develop a technical solution and will cost 5,000 wxDAI that will be requested to Conviction Voting retroactively after the Commons Upgrade.
If this proposal is approved (more than 85% approval rate) the Commons Swarm team will start prototyping a solution to be implemented before the Commons Upgrade. The detailed implementation will be proposed to the Hatch DAO since this solution will involve minting of tokens and be attached to the bonding curve.
The goal of funding this development in the TEC is to effectively return some of the voice that was earned but taken away from core contributors, because of their monetary compensation."
I know this is probably a bit late in the process, but we had a very interesting discussion about the snapshot vote at the close of the Commons Swarm call, and I wanted to put something here for the wider community. @chuygarcia92 shared with us why he voted âNoâ, and since I think he wanted to write something here too Iâll leave it to him to explain his reasoning in full, but one of the fears he expressed, and which I also share is that in a way this âpatchingâ to amend past mistakes compromises the structure and system of the TEC in a way that makes a clean slate impossible long-term, and this even before we have launched.
At the end of the day, this non transferrable governance power does âtack onâ an element of centralization to the governance of the Token Engineering Commons, forever. This feels sadly ironic to me.
Iâve ended up voting in favor of the proposal, because I think itâs important to honor the result of the praise debate vote, but since the actual implementation details are not set in stone,
I wanted to openly float the idea of binding the additional voting power to the vesting period, so that it slowly decreases with time.
This would set a definite end to the consequences of the IH conflict, and guarantee that in the future the bonding curve alone regulates the TEC economy, as was originally intended. Until then, the governance giveback would help adequately honor the sweat equity and knowledge of the people who set it in motion.
I would love to hear your opinions on this, and also get some feedback on if this is technically feasible. I apologize for bringing up something like this so late.
First of all, Iâd like to apologize for expressing this so late into the vote. Even though I originally supported this proposal, I have to say I strongly disagree with the possible outcomes. Some key points to my reasoning:
This is trying to fix with governance what shouldâve been about compensation. I feel that ship has sailed and if we go down this path weâll just eventually face more trouble around the centralization issues this vote involves. Imagine coming across a DAO whose goals you feel identified with, but having some of its seed members have permanent decision power.
Non-transferable governance tokens are like having a CEO in a DAO. I donât feel both concepts coexist in the same environment. We shouldnât be able to fix voting power to specific members since this would be closer to a traditional rigged political system, which is everything weâre trying to get away from.
Our goal is clear: Advance Token Engineering. Executing this proposal would consume resources and time to achieve what I think is the opposite of advancing anywhere. These resources should be allocated to funding proposals where better TE will be implemented, but I feel that with this situation weâre changing a very clear point that has always distinguished the TEC among other communities: weâre DAOing to DAO instead of DAOing to advance TE.
Again, Iâm sorry for bringing this up so late. I have to admit that part of this was because I didnât really have any ideas for a better solution, however I think @0xNugganâs approach of a vesting period (even if itâs additional to the currently set period) is something that could work and end the IH discussion once and for all.
Thanks TEC family, love yâall
I agree with Chuy here. My second thought was that we should implement something that would prevent this from happening in the future.
I could also propose another thing, why not give me and all other contributing members to the TEC a payout for their impact hours commensurate with the amounts given to those who were paid? That is to say, a multiplier of those, since those who were paid gained a LOT of praise since it was literally their job to do so.
Iâm not saying we shouldnât be able to change our minds and revise things after the fact, quite the opposite, but this would seem to go against the spirit of this working arrangement to then shift permanent voting power to the core members who were paid.
You are certain to get praise and impact hours from being paid to do your work in the TEC, so those people who WERE paid should be excluded from those remunerated in the first place.
I can see a much lesser amount- like up to 30% given, but 75% is a LOT.
