I think it was a mistake to define this so specifically as 10 votes… and that the spirit of the idea is that we should accept a polarized result (Praise Juanka for the forethought here).
Agree on this.
For completion, here is how the final result breaks down.
Link to the Transparency of IH Voting.
I want to address three separate things in one post
First, I wish I had waited to reply to the post by @JeffEmmett about the ideas of log voting and randomization. In rereading my response, I don’t think it fits the spirit of this community, and comes across as much more combative than intended. Precision over terminology can come later in the process, if it even matters at all – we can discuss the ideas on their merits in a way that is accessible to all without getting bogged down in technicalities. Let’s avoid the Green Lumber Fallacy
Second, I want to commend both @JeffEmmett and @Griff for their conciliatory energy in the debate earlier this week. This community is really something special, and I think that the way this discussion proceeded is actually a net positive for its growth. I want to thank everyone who met with me and helped me grow as a data analyst through this process.
Finally, on quadratic voting. It seems we are considering various alternatives, and I wanted to point to the pairwise modifications used by GitCoin. I believe the version currently being used by TokenLog is just sum(sqrt(x)) (where x is a list of the quantities of votes for a proposal). The GitCoin version is square(sum(sqrt(x))) - sum(x) – this subtracts off the original voting power, so if only one person votes for a proposal, that proposal receives 0 votes. There is a blog post by Vitalik Buterin with a nice geometric illustration: Pairwise coordination subsidies: a new quadratic funding design - Economics - Ethereum Research
The article also proposes a “pairwise coordination subsidy” which is a second potential modification – this essentially punishes the formation of coalitions that only vote for one issue. These ideas are already established in a related community, and they might be worth throwing in the “Voting Ideas” hat.
I love that the last intervention call became so emotional. I love being part of a community that has the courage to approach these difficult questions. Let’s use this opportunity as a learning and growing opportunity! Thank you all! 
I didn’t take the chance to voice my thoughts at the end of the call. So, here are my 5 cents.
A lot of focus within the DAO space has been on voting. But the way votes are constructed often leads to polarization. And the more at stake, the greater the polarization. It is tempting, like we have done, to do voting rounds where in the final round it stands (mostly) between two finalists. Choose A or B, democrat or republican. First primaries, then presidential election. Polarization is inevitable in this scenario.
How can we avoid that? Maybe the suggestion by @Griff is the way to go from now on? From now on all votes end in compromise.
We want the final decision to represent the opinion of, lets say, 75% of the community. Maybe the top five proposals make up 75% of the vote. Then those five proposal authors have to sit down and come up with a final decision where the intentions of each proposal is weighted against the others.
How does that process look? Probably not look like a hard negotiation but more like a “warm data lab”, as described by Nora Bateson. That for one means the process would need to be facilitated by some outside neutral person.
Imagine a presidential election where the two top most candidates would together get the task of coming up with a third person to step in as president. Compromise!
Would it be interesting to explore this process, formalize it and describe it?
ps. Another way would have been not do this kind of voting at all. I think it can be valuable to explore conviction voting as a tool for signalling and deciding outcomes for these kinds of issues as well. How do we move from a mindset of coming up with better voting tools to one of coming up with better proposals?
The Impact Hour analysis and voting process are over and here is a summary of what happened and how we are moving forward:
The TEC has chosen to use the Trusted Seed Swiss Association as its legal strategy to offer a shield to Hatch participants who will be bootstrapping the TEC’s economy. Contributors who have received Impact Hours through praise but haven’t yet activated its membership won’t receive IH tokens.
During the last 2 months, all the praise dished in the TEC were analyzed. We gathered the issues raised into a problem set that served as the template for IH intervention proposals on Tokenlog.
Does this proposal address that some categories may be under rewarded and others over rewarded?
Does this proposal address the fact that paid contributors have had a 50-85% reduction to their total number of impact hours?
Does this proposal address that foundational members of the Token Engineering Community may lack recognition for their less visible work?
Does this proposal address the distribution of impact hours in relation to equality metrics such as the Gini Coefficient?
9 proposals were submitted and the 4 top voted ones made it to the runoff.
The community reaction to these 2 proposals was very polarized: No Abnormal Intervention had 2590 votes and Praisemagedon had 2389 votes while 3rd and 4th places had 1292 votes combined.
60 unique addresses participated in the full voting cycle including the primaries and a total of 12920 votes were cast.
A scenario that would make half of the community unsatisfied if either of the top proposals won didn’t sound right. We are a value aligned community that has been working incredibly well together for the past year. This was the first polarized situation we have faced, and the first opportunity to choose compromise.
Griff and Jeff, the authors of the top two proposals, agreed to hack on the best solution to integrate them both. What does this look like?
For context, the winning Hatch Params proposal #83 has set a percentage of the total token supply to be allocated to builders. 25% at the min goal, 20% at target goal and 10% at the max goal. The total number of Impact Hours being distributed is 9731.413.
Proportionally to the number of votes of the runoff, No Abnormal Intervention will have an impact over 52% of the IH and Praisemagedon over 48% of the IH. So if we reach the max goal for example, 52% of those 10% will be impacted by No Abnormal Intervention, and 48% of those 10% will be impacted by Praisemagedon.
No Abnormal intervention:
Praisemagedon:
Contributors were divided into 4 buckets based on their activity.
The buckets will correspond to Praisemagedon’s 48% distribution.
We have 29 contributors in the high bucket that will receive 50% of the distribution, 46 contributors in the mid bucket that will receive 30%, 115 contributors in the low bucket that will receive 15% and 193 contributors in the longtail bucket that will get 5% of the distribution.
To prevent a sharp drop between one bucket and another and aim for a gradually round-out distribution, a curve will be applied according to the total IH each contributor would receive if adjustments haven’t happened. Eg.: 2 people are in the mid bucket, one with many IH, other with less IH. The one with more IH will be on the top of the mid bucket, while the one with less will be in the bottom, closer to the low bucket.
After the bucket distribution is ready, another augmentation will be applied where paid contributors will get deductions according to how many times they received compensation.
This post will continue to be updated in the next couple of days when everything is ready and the lists with the IH results can be shared in their last version for the Hatch.
Thanks to everyone who is participating in this process 
I have been predicting this since the inception of the praise system. It “works” but in a way that replicates many of the problems with the centralized banking system. Not ALL of them, but enough to make it distasteful in some ways.
Quantifying qualitative contribution is always dirty… UBI and a culture of giving (burning man style) are better solutions than this… they just avoid the quantification all together and just reward you for being there.
But I think here we have to remember what the problem is we are trying to solve and evolve to better solve it:
Problem: How do we we reward TEC contributors with sweat equity in the TEC.
Pre-Hatch Solution: Quantify Praise to catch the qualitative work and the quantitative work
Next evolution of the solution seems to be: Quantify Praise to catch the qualitative work and use Sourcecred to distribute value to the quantifiable work.
To reward the qualitative value people are producing, we must acknowlege it (praise does this pretty well!) and then we have to measure it… which is the really hard part.
Update: The vote to restore 75% of governance rights to those who had had theirs deducted will be voted on from Sept 24 -27. There will be a snapshot vote and this is the forum post with the latest information: 75% Governance Giveback - #17 by Juankbell
